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Is a Beef Deficiency  Payment
Pareto-Superior in South Korea?
Gerald C. Nelson  and Yong  Kee  Lee
South Korea uses  a quota and a tariff on beef imports  to keep farm prices high.  Part
of the quota rents are used to support indirect benefits to producers.  The welfare  costs
of these policies are analyzed.  Following a suggestion of Hayami,  a deficiency
payment financed by tariff revenues  from increased imports  is considered as an
alternative to the quota. As Anderson (1983)  found for Japan, a deficiency  payment is
Pareto-superior only  if indirect benefits from the quota revenue are ignored.
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In  the latter half of the  1980s the U.S. began
applying  pressure for more liberal  trade poli-
cies to countries with large trade surpluses with
the U.S., and South Korea was one of  the prime
targets. South Korean beef import restrictions,
which are designed to raise domestic prices to
support  farm  incomes,  were  singled  out  for
attention.  However,  South  Korean  beef pro-
ducers have been violently opposed to any pol-
icy  change  which would lower their incomes.
For South Korean policy makers, a highly de-
sirable  policy change would be one that could
maintain beef producer incomes, provide con-
sumers  with  cheaper  beef by  allowing  more
imports,  and  not raise  government  expendi-
tures.
South Korean import restrictions on beef are
similar to those  of Japan,  so an  exchange  of
ideas in the American Journal  of  Agricultural
Economics in  1979  and  1983  about the  pos-
sibility  of a  Pareto-superior  liberalization  of
Japanese  beef imports is  of interest.  Hayami
argued that the Japanese  beef quota could be
replaced with a deficiency payment set to keep
the effective producer price constant. The cost
of the  deficiency  payment  could be met with
levy revenue from increased imports. The con-
sumer price could be lowered substantially and
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imports increased dramatically. However, An-
derson (1983) argued that the analysis for this
apparently  Pareto-superior  policy  choice  ig-
nored  some of the current beneficiaries  of the
quota rents and the levy revenues. When trans-
fers to these beneficiaries were included in the
analysis,  it was no  longer clear that the defi-
ciency payment approach was Pareto-superior.
As  in Japan,  South Korea  imposes  a beef
import  quota  of varying  amounts  (including
zero)  and an import tariff of 25%  (until 1987
when it was  lowered  to 20%).  The tariff rev-
enue becomes part of general revenue, but the
remaining  quota rent is captured  by the Na-
tional  Livestock  Cooperatives  Federation
(NLCF) which is in charge of purchasing beef
on the world market  and selling  it in the do-
mestic market.'  The  profits are  accumulated
in the Livestock Development Fund (LDF) and
used to provide indirect support  to livestock
producers.  We  examine  the  welfare  costs  of
the  quota  system  and  their  distribution
throughout  the economy.  Second,  we  follow
Anderson's  approach  and examine  the direct
and indirect  effects  of a  deficiency  payment
scheme  which  keeps the producer  price  con-
stant and at the same time  does not increase
net government  expenditures  (see  Anderson
1986 which reports the results from Anderson
The National Livestock  Cooperatives Federation became the
Livestock Product Marketing  Organization in the late  1980s.  We
use the earlier name in this article because  the analysis  is based
on data from the earlier period.
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1983 and compares them with a brief analysis
for South Korea). Within those constraints, we
examine various options for the consumer price
level and the benefits from LDF expenditures.
The Livestock  Sector in South  Korea
With  rapid  economic  growth,  South  Korean
meat  consumption  has  increased  relative  to
cereals.  Of the  various  meats,  fish  and pork
are the most  important,  but consumption  of
beef and poultry has grown in recent years (ta-
ble 1). Total beef consumption rose nearly six-
fold from  1965  to  1987, increasing  at an av-
erage annual rate of8.1%, and reached 152,000
metric tons (mt) in  1987.  The positive  effect
of income growth, together with a strong con-
sumption  preference  for  meat  products,  has
outweighed the negative effect of a rising beef
price. However, with per capita consumption
of 3.6 kilograms (kg) in 1987,  beef consump-
tion in South Korea  is still small compared to
the U.S. and to neighboring  countries such as
Japan and Hong Kong.
The total number of cattle, including native2
and dairy  cattle,  has steadily  increased  at an
average annual rate of 2.7%, from  1.3 million
head in 1965 to 2.4 million head in 1987. Na-
tive cattle,  which  made  up  over  80%  of the
beef herd in  1987 and are the main source  of
beef in  South  Korea,  grew  1.7%  during  the
same period. However, the domestic supply of
beef has not kept pace with increasing demand.
Limited availability of feedstuffs and land and
small  farm  size have  all acted  as constraints.
Since almost all arable land is devoted to grow-
ing food  grains,  there has been  a shortage  of
land for pasture and fodder crops. In addition,
South  Korean  beef production  is  based  pri-
marily  on  small-scale  cattle  raising  which  is
generally  carried  out as  a supplementary  ac-
tivity to grain production,  using unimproved
hillsides, riverbank grass, or farm byproducts.
As a result, most cattle probably receive little
commercial  feedstuffs,  although  statistics  to
document this are not available.  Ninety-three
2 The cattle herd is classified into three broad categories-native,
beef, and dairy.  All categories  are used for meat, but beef cattle,
of  which there are few, are raised exclusively for meat. The number
of dairy cattle  has increased  very rapidly  since the early  1970s.
Native cattle traditionally have been kept by most South  Korean
farms as draft animals and are one of the most valuable assets for
farmers.  In general, Koreans prefer the taste of native beef.
Table  1.  Total  Beef  Consumption  (Metric
Tons)  and Per Capita Livestock  Consumption
(Kilograms)
Total Beef  Per Capita Consumption of
Consump-  Poul-
Year  tion  Beef  Pork  try  Fisha
1965  27,261  1.0  1.9  .5  20.6
1970  37,340  1.2  2.6  1.4  24.1
1975  70,292  2.0  2.8  1.6  44.3
1980  99,974  2.6  6.3  2.4  46.0
1985  120,342  2.9  8.4  3.1  57.9
1987  151,926  3.6  8.8  3.3  56.3
Sources: For beef, pork, and poultry, the National  Livestock  Co-
operatives  Federation, the  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,  and
Fisheries, and Shin; for fish,  Hayes, Ahn, and Baumel.
a Includes fresh fish, dried fish, and sea plants.
percent  of farmers raising less than five head
of  native cattle accounted for almost two thirds
of total  native  cattle.  Average  herd  size  per
farm was only 2.3 head as of the end of 1987.
Imports and Protection Policy 3
Imports  of beef into South Korea for general
consumption were prohibited before  1976. Be-
cause of a rapid increase  in demand for beef
and  an improvement  in the  balance  of pay-
ments,  beginning in  1976  beef imports  were
allowed but limited by a quota. Imports were
suspended in 1980 because of a decrease in the
demand for beef and a sharp deterioration in
the balance of payments, both associated with
a recession in the overall South Korean econ-
omy. Along with economic  recovery in 1981,
beef imports again were permitted.  But due to
a weakened demand for beef and a significant
decline  in domestic cattle  prices beginning in
1984,  the government  once  more  suspended
beef imports in order to stop a further decline
in  cattle  prices.  As the balance  of payments
improved  and pressure  for agricultural  trade
liberalization  strengthened,  limited  beef im-
ports resumed in 1988.
Beef imports are subject to an import quota
the size of which is determined by estimating
the difference between expected consumption
and  production  at  the  existing  market  price
during  a given  year.  If there appears  to be  a
3This section draws heavily on Shin  and Williams, and Johns.
See also Jones and Dyck for  recent information.
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Table 2.  Status of Agricultural and Livestock  Sectors  in the South Korean Economy
1970  1975  1980  1983  1985  1987
Share of Agriculture
a in  .............................................-  ..................  .....................
GDP  26.5  24.4  14.6  13.6  13.8  11.5
Population  48.3  40.0  30.6  25.6  22.5  20.0
Labor force  50.4  45.9  34.0  29.7  24.9  21.9
Share of Livestock in
Agricultural Production  Value  7.9  6.2  8.1  14.0  9.7  8.5
Farm Household  Income  5.6  7.4  12.1  25.4  17.0  15.8
Percentage of Cattle-Raising Farms  - 54.1  47.3  50.1  56.6  47.7
Sources: The Ministry of Agriculture,  Forestry, and Fisheries; the National Livestock  Cooperatives Federation.
a Includes forestry  and fisheries sectors.
production shortfall,  the government  can im-
port  directly or  give approval  to a firm  or  a
person  who  applies  for  an  import  permit.
However,  the  NLCF,  a  quasi-governmental
organization,  actually  is  given  responsibility
for  all  beef importation  used  for local  con-
sumption.  The  NLCF also  is  empowered  to
buy,  sell,  and  stockpile  beef to  stabilize  the
domestic price of beef within an economically
and  politically  acceptable  stabilization  band.
Revenues  of the NLCF are derived from pur-
chasing beef on the world market at the world
price (plus the tariff described below) and sell-
ing the beef in the domestic  market at whole-
sale prices set by the NLCF. Net revenues are
accumulated  in the LDF and used to provide
indirect support to livestock producers through
various activities such as a livestock improve-
ment  and  breeding  program,  dairy  products
promotion,  storage of livestock products,  de-
velopment  of pasture  land,  improvement  of
the  livestock  marketing  system,  research  for
livestock development,  and provision of tech-
nical extension services.
In addition to  the quota,  an import tax  is
applied.  The  ad  valorem  tariff rate  on  beef
imports is 30%, but the lower GATT conces-
sion tariff rates are applied to GATT-member
countries.  This rate was 25% before  1987 and
20% afterwards.
Rationale for Intervention
A central  goal  of South Korea's  agricultural
policies has been to increase farm incomes to
narrow  the  disparity  with  nonfarm  income.
While 20% of the total population  is engaged
in agricultural  production,  only  11.5%  of na-
tional  income  is produced in the agricultural
sector. South Korean farm size is very small;
the cultivated  area per farm averages only  1.1
hectares. With high livestock prices caused by
import restrictions,  livestock  production  has
become  attractive  to  farmers  as  an  income
source.  The  share  of livestock  in  total  farm
household income increased from 5.6% in 1970
to a peak of 25.4% in 1983 before declining to
15.8% in  1987 (table  2).
Benefits  and Costs of the Beef  Import Quota
In estimating the benefits and costs arising from
the beef imports quota in South Korea, a tra-
ditional Marshallian partial equilibrium mod-
el is employed, with linear demand and supply
functions.  The  assumptions  of  Marshallian
welfare analysis lead to the definition of social
cost as the loss in consumer and producer sur-
plus  caused  by departures  from  competitive
equilibrium.  Thus,  if we assume  a Hicksian
compensated  demand curve,4 consumer  sur-
plus is the area under the demand curve above
the equilibrium price. Producer surplus is the
area  above the supply  curve below the equi-
librium price. The supply curve is assumed to
measure  the opportunity cost of the resources
used to produce that commodity. 5
4 If the income effect of the price change is zero, this assumption
is not necessary, because the ordinary demand curve and the Hicks-
ian  compensated  demand curve  coincide.  See Just,  Hueth,  and
Schmitz  for an extended discussion of welfare  measures.
5 By ignoring marketing costs and using demand (supply) price
elasticities  at the retail  (farm) level  and prices  at the wholesale
level, we introduce some bias in our welfare measures.  However,
the extent of the  bias depends on the actual shape  of the  curves
relative to the assumed linear curves and the degree to which prices
shift away  from the  current level.  We also  introduce some  bias
because the elasticity estimates from which we chose our param-
eters are based on  functional forms other than linear.
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Figure 1.  The South Korean beef market
The partial equilibrium effects of South Ko-
rea's current import quota scheme and import
tax can be seen in figure  1. D and S represent
domestic  demand  and  supply  functions  for
beef, both of which are linear approximations
of the actual curvilinear functions. The world
supply of beefis assumed to be perfectly elastic
(the small  country  assumption)  at the world
price, P,. Imports are restricted to the quantity
Q3  Q4,  so  that the domestic  support  price  is
maintained  at  a level  P,  higher than  world
price, P,. Marketing  costs are  assumed to be
zero,  so  producer  and  consumer  prices  are
identical. At price P,, Q3 is domestically pro-
duced and the quota Q3 Q4 is imported to meet
domestic demand, Q4. Pt  is determined by add-
ing  the ad valorem  tariff to the world  price.
From the current import quota scheme,  total
rent of area a bj i accrues. Of this, the amount
d e j  i accrues  to the government  treasury  as
tariff revenue, and the remaining, area a b ed,
which comes from the import quota, is trans-
ferred to the LDF and spent on indirect sup-
port for livestock sector development.
Two trapezoidal  areas,  a c  h  i and  b j k f,
represent  the  social  costs  due  to the  import
quota  scheme  (assuming  that the tariff is  al-
ready in place).  The production efficiency loss
from both the tariff and import quota, the tri-
angle a g i, is the  difference  between the  re-
source cost of domestic production stimulated
by the quota,  Q1 g a Q3, and the opportunity
cost,  Q1 g i Q3. The production  efficiency loss
from  the imposition  of the tariff alone  is c g
h. Thus, the area a c h i is the net production
efficiency  loss  caused  by  the  import  quota.
Analogous consumer distortion losses also are
generated.
The  changes  in benefit and cost associated
with the removal  of the import quota can be
measured  in terms of point estimates of price
elasticities  of demand  and supply  and initial
prices and quantities as follows. Following An-
derson  (1983),  r stands  for the proportional
change  in  domestic  price  when  the  quota
scheme is removed,  i.e., r = (P, - Pt)/Ps, and
eD and  es are the price  elasticities  of demand
and  supply,  respectively,  at  observed  prices
and quantities:
(1)  AS = Q2 -Q3  =-resQ 3,
(2)  AC = Q5 - Q4= -reQ4,
and
(3)  AM = AC-  AS = r(esQ3 - eDQ4),
where AS, AC, and AM denote changes in pro-
duction,  consumption,  and  imports,  respec-
tively, caused by removal of the quota.
From these basic equations the effects of the
elimination of the quota (but retention of the
import  tax)  on  producer  welfare,  consumer
welfare,  and  government  revenue  can be  ob-
tained as follows:
(4) AW  =areaPsacP,=  -rPQ 3(1 -res,
(5)  A W  = area P, bfPt = rPQ4(1 - re,),
and
(6)  A Wg = area cfk h - a bj i
= (Pt - P)(Q 4 - Q 3)
- r(P, - P)(eDQ 4 - esQ3)
where A  W,, A Wc, and A  Wg are changes in pro-
ducer  and  consumer  welfare  and  change  in
government  revenue,  respectively.  When  the
domestic price  decreases,  A  Wp  and A  W  are
unambiguously negative and positive, respec-
tively, but A  Wg  is indeterminate.  The change
in government  revenue is affected by both de-
mand and  supply elasticities.  If the absolute
values of the demand  and supply  elasticities
are large enough so that the value of  the second
term in the right side of equation  (6) exceeds
that of the first term which is always negative,
Wg  is positive,  and vice versa. As shown in
equations (4) and (5), the welfare effect on pro-
ducers is greater the smaller the price elasticity
of supply while the consumer welfare  effect is







D r;»  i ,
i i
i
f  xWestern Journal  of Agricultural  Economics
solute value.  The change  in government  rev-
enue becomes  greater the larger  the absolute
value of the  demand and  supply  elasticities,
ceteris paribus. Net  social  welfare  change  is
derived  by adding up equations  (4),  (5),  and
(6).
The  net  social  welfare  change  from  elimi-
nating the quota (but retaining the tariff) also
can be expressed  in terms of deadweight  loss
as follows:
(7)  DWp = area a c h i =  'resQ3(Ps + P, - 2P,)
and
(8)  DWc = area bj kf= -=reDQ 4(P, + P,-  2Pw),
where  DWp and DWc are  the reductions  of
production  efficiency  loss  and  consumption
distortion loss from the removal of the import
quota, respectively,  which depend on the dif-
ference  between P, and P, and supply and de-
mand elasticities, ceteris paribus.
The  sum of DWp and DWc is equal to the
sum  of three  components-producer  welfare
changes,  consumer  welfare  changes,  and the
change in government revenue.  Thus, the for-
mula of the net social welfare change is as fol-
lows:
(9)  AWs  = AWp + AWc  + AWg
= DWp + DWc
= -r(Ps + Pt - 2Pw)(esQ3 - eDQ4).
The larger the demand and supply elasticities
and r, (the price difference between Ps and Pt),
the greater  the net  social  welfare  gain  from
eliminating the quota.
The  data  used  to  generate  the  results  are
found in the appendix.  The parameter  which
caused the most difficulty was the supply elas-
ticity because of  the wide variance in empirical
estimates.  As a result we use two supply elas-
ticities-1.12  (Case  I) and .44 (Case II)-that
reflect the range  of estimates.
The effects of removing the import quota for
beef on production, consumption,  and imports
are shown in table 3. The effects on welfare are
presented  in table  4.6 In  Case  I,  production
6 Note that cross-price  effects  are ignored.  Koo and Watt esti-
mate cross-price  elasticities with  respect  to pork and  poultry  of
.29 and 1.17, respectively. The poultry cross-price elasticity seems
implausible.  However,  assuming  it is  correct,  and  using Case  I
parameters, pork consumption would decline by 40,000 mt (14.8%)
Table 3.  Average Annual Effects of Removing
the  Beef  Import Quota  on  Production,  Con-
sumption, and Imports
Produc-  Consump-  Self-Suf-
tion  tion  Imports  ficiency
..................----------  (000 mt)  ----------..--------------  (%)
Baseline  71.9  107.0  35.1  67.2
Case I  30.8  161.0  130.2  19.1
Case II  55.8  161.0  105.2  34.7
Source: Own calculations;  see appendix.
Note: Case I: es =  1.12; Case II:  es = .44; in both cases, e, =  .99;
mt = metric tons; averages are for 1981-84.
declines  by  57.2%  to  30,800  mt, while  con-
sumption increases  by 50.5% to  161,000  mt,
and  thus  self-sufficiency  drops  sharply  from
67.2% to  19.1%.  Consumer surplus  increases
to $571.7  million,  and the losses of producer
surplus  and  the government  revenue  decline
to $219.2  and $71.7  million,  respectively,  so
that the net welfare  gain is $280.8  million. In
Case II, producer loss is greater and therefore
net welfare gain is smaller because the supply
elasticity is smaller. In both cases government
revenue  decreases  even  though  imports  in-
crease.
Effect on  Income Redistribution
The welfare analysis  above ignores  the possi-
bility  of differing  social  welfare  weights  for
market  participants.  But a  major  reason  for
the beef import policies  is to redistribute  in-
come  in favor  of farmers.  Table  5 shows  to
what  extent  the removal  of the  beef import
quota would reduce producer income in South
Korea. In Case II, with an inelastic supply re-
sponse,  the loss  of producer  surplus  of $2.9
million amounts to approximately 2.2% of to-
tal agricultural  value added.7 The annual loss
per cattle-raising  farm is about $281  or 5.9%
of farm income. In Case I, with an elastic sup-
ply response,  the income effects are somewhat
smaller.
and poultry consumption by 63,800 mt (59.7%) if the beef import
quota  were  removed.  The  corresponding  increase  in  beef con-
sumption would be 54,000  mt. These numbers  should be viewed
with a great deal of caution.
7 If cross-price  effects were  considered  and  farms raising  beef,
poultry,  and  pork  were  identical,  the  negative  impact  on  farm
incomes would be even larger.
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Table  4.  Average  Annual  Estimated Welfare  Effects  of  Removing  the  Beef  Import Quota
($  million)
A Wp  A W,  A Wg  D  Wp  DWc  A W
Case I  -219.2  571.7  -71.7  121.3  159.5  280.8
Case II  -272.4  571.7  -92.2  47.7  159.5  207.2
Source:  Own calculations;  see appendix.
Note:  Case I: e,  = 1.12;  Case II:  e,  = .44. W =  welfare change;  subscripts p, c, and g stand for  producer,  consumer, and government,
respectively. DW is reduction in deadweight loss. The exchange rate used to convert from won to dollars in this and all following tables
was 748.6. AW,  + AWc  + AW,  = DWp + DWc = AW,.  Averages  are for  1981-84. Numbers may not sum  due to rounding.
If we  consider  producer  benefits  from  in-
direct support such as research, extension  ser-
vice,  improvement  of breed  and other  tech-
nological assistance, which is supported by the
quota rent  from beef imports,  the impact on
producers'  income  would  be  much  larger.
About $149.7  million of quota rent would be
lost  if the  beef  import  quota  scheme  were
dropped. On the assumption that all the pre-
existing import quota rents have been used to
increase the cattle-raising farm income directly
and/or indirectly,  per  farm  loss  increases  to
about  $436  in  Case  II  or  over  9%  of farm
income (table 6).
The income redistribution effects of the beef
import quota scheme between producers  and
consumers  are  shown  in table  7.  Per  capita
producer  welfare  change  is  calculated  by di-
viding  total  producer  welfare  change  by  the
population  of cattle-raising  farms.  Per capita
change in consumer welfare is computed in the
same manner using the total population.  For
Case  II, per capita  producer loss amounts  to
$59 while per capita  consumer gain  is about
$14.  These  estimates  of  consumer  welfare
change are bigger than those found by Ander-
son (1981) for South Korea, while the producer
welfare changes  are similar (table 8). It should
be noted that Anderson's results are based on
removing  both the quota and tariff while this
study analyzes the effects of removing only the
quota. Thus, with the beef import quota scheme
each producer gains about four times as much
as the amount each consumer loses on average,
even though total producer welfare gain is only
about half of total consumer welfare loss. 8
Analysis  of Deficiency  Payment
Schemes  with Alternate Objectives
Liberalization  of trade  in beef without  some
additional policy change will result in a decline
in the domestic beef price with a negative effect
on  farm  incomes  in  South Korea.  The  first-
best  policy  instrument  to  support  farm  in-
comes-a direct income  transfer-is likely to
be politically  unacceptable  because  of its ad-
ditional  burden on the government's  budget,
even assuming no implementation cost. How-
ever, given an appropriate constellation of pa-
rameters,  it is theoretically  possible that a de-
ficiency  payment  scheme  similar  to  that
proposed  for Japan by Hayami  could  permit
lower consumer prices and increased  imports
without reducing producer  income  and with-
out drawing on general tax revenue. We follow
the general approach of Anderson (1983) and
8  Farmers  also consume  beef,  and  a decline  in the  beef price
would reduce their consumption expenditures and partially  offset
the loss in income.  However,  the consumption  effect is  likely  to
be small for most farmers as their income is less than their urban
counterparts and the income elasticity for beef is  large.
Table 5.  Average  Annual Impact of Removal  of the Beef Import Quota on  Farm Income
Unit  Case I  Case  II
Change in Producer Welfare  $ million  -2.4  -2.9
Share of Producer Loss in Agricultural  Value Addeda  %  1.76  2.19
Per Farm Loss  $  -226.4  -281.3
Share of Loss in Farm Income Per Farm  %  4.75  5.90
Source:  Own calculations;  see appendix.
Note:  Case I: es = 1.12; Case II:  es = .44; averages  are for  1981-84.
a Includes  forestry and fisheries sectors.
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Table  6.  Average  Annual  Adjusted  Impact of  Removal  of  the Beef  Import Quota on  Farm
Income
Unit  Case I  Case II
Change in Producer Welfare  $ million  -219.2  -272.4
Loss in Quota Rent  $ million  -149.7  -149.7
Per Farm Loss  $  -381.1  -436.0
Share of Per Farm Loss in Farm Income  %  7.99  9.14
Source: Own calculations;  see appendix.
Note:  Case I: e, =  1.12; Case II: es = .44; averages are for  1981-84.
examine effects of various  types of deficiency
payment programs.  All options  keep the pro-
ducer price at its current level so that producer
welfare is unchanged and finance the deficien-
cy payments  from the increased tax revenues
from imports.
Figure  2  is basically  the  same  as  figure  1
except  that P,-the  new  policy  variable-is
added.  To meet the policy  goal of supporting
producer income, the domestic producer  sup-
port price, P,, and domestic production,  Q1, are
fixed  at  current  levels.  The  import quota  is
initially Q1 Q2 so that the domestic  consump-
tion is at point b. The total government import
revenue,  a b j  i, consists  of tariff revenue, f  g
j  i, and the NLCF's profits,  a b gf,  which are
accumulated  in the LDF.
For  any  choice  of Pc,  given  P,, consumer
welfare  increases  by the area  P, b e Pc while
producer  welfare  remains  unchanged.  The
change  in government  revenue  from  trade is
the difference  between two  rectangular  areas,
c e k i minus a b j  i. In addition,  the subsidy
payment to compensate for the price difference
is Ps a c  Pc. Thus,  the net social welfare  gain
from the new policy will  be the area  b e k j.
The lower the Pc, the larger the net social wel-
fare  gain.  But since P, is  fixed and  the price
difference  between  P, and  Pc is to  be  subsi-
dized, the increase in net social welfare is much
smaller than in the case of no support price.
We denote the new government import rev-
enue  (c  e k i) by  G1,  the  initial government
import revenue  (a b j  i) by Go,  and the defi-
ciency payment (Ps a c Pc) by S. v(=(P  - Pc)/
Ps) is a policy variable representing  a propor-
tional reduction  in domestic  consumer price
from Ps and varies from  zero to (P, - Pt)/Ps.





Gl =  Gtl  + Nl1 =  area c e ki
= PsQ2eDv2
- [mQ2eD + P,(Q 2 - Ql)]
+ m(Q2 - Q),
Go = Go + No = area a bj i
= m(Q2 - Ql),
S = area P, a c Pc
= PsQv,
and
(13) AG = AG, +  ANp,
where m = Ps - Pw, Gt represents government
tariff revenue,  and Np is NLCF's profits  from
the  difference  between  domestic  and  import
prices.  Government revenue,  G,  is composed
Table 7.  Average  Annual Income  Redistribution Effects  of the Quota
Change in Producer Welfare  Change in Consumer Welfare
Total  Per Capitab  Total  Per Capita
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (A)/(C)a  (B)/(D)a
$ million  $  $ million  $
Case  I  -219.2  -47.4  571.7  14.4  0.38  3.29
Case  II  -272.4  -59.0  571.7  14.4  0.48  4.10
Source:  Own calculations;  see appendix.
Note: Case I: e  =  1.12;  Case II: es =  .44;  averages  are for  1981-84;  numbers may not sum due to rounding.
a  Absolute  value.
bAverage number of persons per cattle-raising farm is assumed to be 4.77 during  1981-84.
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Table 8.  Average  Annual  Estimates of  Con-
sumer and Producer Welfare Effects from Beef
Trade Liberalization
Anderson
This Study  (1981)
Unit  Case  IIa Results
Change in Producer Welfare
Total  $ million  -272.4  -244.3
Per Capitab  $  -59.0  -40.5
Change in Consumer Welfare
Total  $ million  571.7  497.2
Per Capita  $  14.4  14.0
a  See table 7.






Figure 2.  F
beef market
uantity
'olicy options in the South Korean
of tariff revenue,  G, and NLCF profits, Np. A
zero subscript indicates the initial state, a one
subscript the new state. G, is a quadratic equa-
tion in v, Go is constant, and S increases mono-
tonically with v. It is also clear that  G,  is di-
rectly  influenced  by  the  price  elasticity  of
demand,  eD,  but is independent  of the supply
elasticity.
The  larger the v, the greater is  the welfare
gain (the trapezoid  b e k j). How  large v can
be increased  depends on which policy  option
is  adopted.  The  important  constraint  influ-
encing policy options is that no additional gov-
ernment expenditure is allowed. The other fac-
tor  to be  considered  in  choosing  the  policy
options  is  how  to  deal  with the  preexisting
producers' indirect support from NLCF's quo-
ta rent, area a b gf  in figure  2. The more this
indirect support is reduced, the more flexible
the policy options.
The  policy  options  examined  are:  (a)  in-
crease  v (the proportional  reduction  in con-
sumer  price)  so  as  to maximize  government
revenue from imports, G,; (b) increase v to the
extent that government  revenue  is just equal
to the deficiency payment,  G,  = S; (c) increase
v to maximize net government  revenue, G,  -
S; and (d) increase  v until the point where  G,
covers not only S but also Go or ANp = Np  -
Npo = 0. In other words, the indirect producers'
benefits from Npo are continued. Note that only
one  option  (d)  ensures  Pareto-superiority,
while  option  (c)  is Pareto-superior  if the  re-
cipients of indirect support are not counted.
Figures  3a  and  3b  illustrate  the  options
graphically. Figure 3a represents the case where
the demand elasticity is large enough [ eD I >
PI(Ps - Pw)]  that  the  government  revenue
curve, Gl, crosses S +  Go [and options (c) and
(d) are feasible], while figure 3b shows the case
where the government  revenue  curve  lies be-
low S  +  Go.  Gi  =  Go  when v is zero  at the
intercept of m(Q2 - Q1),  which is initial gov-
ernment import revenue. At points a, b, and
c,  the  options  (a),  (b),  and  (c)  are  satisfied,
respectively, and point d, where G 1 = S +  Go,
satisfies option (d). Option (b) guarantees the
biggest reduction of domestic consumer price,
and therefore the largest net social welfare gains
of the four policy alternatives,  and option (c)
generates the smallest price reduction policy.
For option (a) [maximum government  im-
port  revenue  (G 1 )], the solution  is  to set the
first derivative of function Gl with respect to
v at zero and solve for v:
(14)
The  second-order  condition  for a maximum
d2G1 is satisfied, that is,  2 = 2PsQ 2 eD < 0, so that
dv2
Va  generates  maximum import  revenue.  The
bigger  the  difference  between  the  domestic
producer  price and  the world  price,  and  the
greater the price  elasticity of demand in ab-
solute value, the larger the  va. Also, the larger
the current quota amount, i.e., the smaller the
ratio of production  to  consumption  (Ql/Q2),
the smaller is va.
For policy option (b), v is chosen to set gov-
ernment revenue  equal to the deficiency  pay-
ment. In this case no indirect benefits are pos-
sible. The solution for v in this case is obtained
Nelson and Lee
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Figure 3b.  Comparison of four policy options,
eD  < P/(Ps  - Pw)
by solving the quadratic equation  that results
from  setting equation  (10)  equal to  equation
(12). The positive root of vb is chosen:
(15)  Vb=  (meD + P,)Q2
- [(meD + Ps)
2Q  - 4PsQ2eDm(Q2 - Ql)]"
+ 2PsQ2eD.
For policy option  (c),  v  is chosen to maxi-
mize  net government  revenue  (G1 - S). The
solution  for  v is obtained  by taking  the first
derivative  of G1 - S with respect  to  v  and
setting it equal to zero:
(16) \=P, - P,  1
Vc  -P  + PI  eDs
For positive  v,,  I  eD I > P/(Ps  - Pw); an equiv-
alent  condition  is that the demand  curve be
elastic at Q2.
For policy option (d), the domestic consum-
er price can be reduced (vd  > 0) only when the
increase in government revenue is sufficient to
cover the deficiency payment. The original tar-
iff and quota revenue are assumed to be spent
on indirect support  activities  which continue
at the  same  level.  The  solution  for  vd is  ob-
tained by setting AG, = G1  - Go - S and ANp
= 0in (13). That is,
AG = AG,  +  N, = G  - Go -S.
The solution  is
1  P(1 + t) (17)  v  1(d  =1+
eD  Ps
vd is greater than zero [and option (d) is fea-
sible]  only when  leol  >  Ps/(Ps - Pt). If AGt
is  also  zero  so  that  G 1 =  Go  +  S,  then the
solution for vd becomes:
(17') v'  +  1  - 1
De  ,  s
Empirical Analysis  of Deficiency
Payment Options
Of the four possible policy options, options (c)
and (d), and therefore any Pareto-superior out-
come,  are  not possible  because  the  demand
elasticity is not large enough. Given domestic
and  world prices,  the consumer  price  can be
reduced,  compensating  for subsidy  payment
costs  and  without  reducing  indirect  benefits
from the preexisting  quota rent,  only  if I  eD
>  1.64.
Both options (a) and  (b) are  feasible (table
9);  Va  is  .138  and  vb  is  .291.  Domestic con-
sumption increases by 14,700 mt in option (a)
and by 30,800 mt in option (b). These increas-
es in domestic consumption lead to an equiv-
alent  increase  in  imports  because  domestic
production remains unchanged. The net social
welfare  gains  are  $66  million  for option  (a)
and $119.2 million for option (b).
With government revenue  from trade poli-
cies  maximized  [option  (a)],  it  increases  to
$195.4 million, only $16.8 million over initial
revenue. With this option, the consumer price
declines 13.8%.  With government revenue  set
equal to the deficiency payment,  revenue  de-
clines by $3.7 million, and the consumer price
I  G
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drops by 29.1%. In both cases, the net change
in government  revenue  is negative,  and indi-
rect  producer  support  would  have  to be  re-
duced.
Conclusions
This  article  addresses  three  basic  questions
about South Korean beef import policies. First,
how large are the income transfers among pro-
ducers, consumers, and government as a result
of the import quota scheme? Second, how are
the welfare changes distributed intersectorally?
Third, are  there any Pareto-superior  alterna-
tives to existing policies?
We find the expected result that the import
quota has led to producer gains together with
considerable  consumer and deadweight losses.
The net positive costs imply that the beef im-
port quota has distorted  efficient resource  al-
location by inducing more production domes-
tically than would  exist under free trade  and
by restricting consumption to a level less than
that under free trade.
Income redistribution  to farmers  is an im-
portant policy goal,  however,  and the current
set of beef policy instruments has contributed
to that goal. Between  $219  million and $272
million (in  1985  won equivalent)  were trans-
ferred to producers annually at the expense of
consumers during 1981-84, equal to about 2%
of total agricultural value added. The average
annual per farm income gain was between $226
and $281,  or over  5% of average per farm in-
come during the same period.  The increase in
per capita  income  in the cattle-raising  sector
far outweighs  the  decrease  in per capita con-
sumer  income  from  the  beef import  quota
scheme.  It is  also likely that beef consumers
are in the upper income classes and can there-
fore  more easily absorb the costs.  This result
helps to explain why producers respond much
more strongly to policy changes related to beef
prices than consumers have in the past.
Our  analysis  has demonstrated  that if the
demand elasticity were substantially higher, it
would be possible to implement  a Pareto-su-
perior deficiency  payment scheme.  However,
with the parameter estimates we used, we find
(as Anderson  1983  found for Japan) there ex-
ists no deficiency  payment scheme which can
lower  consumer  prices,  keep  producer  direct
incomes constant, and at the same time main-
tain  indirect  producer  income  support  from
Table 9.  Average  Annual Effects  of New  Pol-
icy  Options on Consumer  Price, Imports,  So-
cial Welfare,  and Government  Expenditure
Unit  Option (a)  Option (b)
v  %  13.8  29.1
Pc  $/kg  7.21  5.94
Ps  $/kg  8.37  8.37
P,  $/kg  3.28  3.28
AS  1,000 mt  0  0
AC  1,000 mt  14.7  30.8
AM  1,000 mt  14.7  30.8
AP  . $ million  0  0
AWs  $ million  66.0  119.2
G,  $ million  195.4  174.9
Go  $ million  178.6  178.6
S  $ million  83.2  174.9
Gl - (Go  + S)  $ million  -66.4  -178.6
Source:  Own calculations;  see appendix.
Note: Option (a) is to increase  v so  as to maximize government
revenue (G); option (b) is to increase v  so that government revenue
is just equal to the deficiency payment (G.  = S). Variables: v = (P,
- P)/Ps; Pc = policy-determined consumer  price;  P, = domestic
producer support  price;  Pw = world  price;  AS =  changes  in pro-
duction; AC = changes in consumption;  AM = changes in imports;
A  W  =  changes  in  producer  welfare;  AWs  =  net  social welfare
change;  Go  = the initial government  import revenue;  S = the de-
ficiency payment. Averages  are for  1981-84.
research and extension  efforts financed  out of
quota revenues. 9
If recipients of the indirect benefits could be
ignored, then it would be possible to maintain
producer direct income, increase imports, and
lower  the  market  price  by  14%  to  29%  de-
pending upon the supply elasticity, without in-
creasing general government expenditures. To
achieve this,  however, LDF  expenditures  for
research,  development,  and  extension  would
be severely curtailed. Unfortunately, for South
Korea there is no such thing as a "free lunch."
So long as lump sum transfers are not feasible,
either producers or the government must bear
some costs as the government responds to the
external pressures for trade liberalization.  Ei-
ther general revenues must be used to maintain
support  or  beef producers  must  suffer  a  re-
duction in income, either directly from a lower
price  or  indirectly  via reduced  research  and
development expenditures  by the LDF.
[Received May 1990; final revision
received January  1991.]
9  As income shifts the demand curve out, the areas representing
consumer loss and producer gain grow,  and it is possible that the
demand elasticity that allows a deficiency payment  to be Pareto-
superior becomes  smaller.  However,  we  have  not explored  that
possibility.
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Appendix
Data on domestic production,  consumption, and imports
were taken from Major  Statistics on Agriculture, Forestry,
and  Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture,  Forestry, and Fish-
eries, and Materials  on Price,  Demand, and  Supply ofLive-
stock Products, NLCF. The figures  were averaged  for the
years 1981 to 1984 (table Al). Wholesale prices ofboneless
beef were used for the domestic beef price, P,. The proxy
for the world price, P,,  was calculated by dividing the cif
value of total imports  by the quantity  of total  imports,
and then converting  it into equivalent South Korean cur-
rency, won, using the annual average official exchange rates
of corresponding years. It might be argued that consumer
surplus should be measured at the retail level and producer
surplus at the farm gate  level.  However,  for consistency
in handling, marketing, and processing costs, demand and
supply at both  retail  and farm gate  levels can  be  repre-
sented by parallel shifts from those of the wholesale level.
With this assumption, consumer and producer surplus can
be  measured  approximately  with  wholesale  prices  (Ha-
yami).
Empirical  estimates of demand and supply  elasticities
vary from study to study depending on what methods and
what data are used, and on the periods covered (table A2).
The price  elasticity of demand for beef was estimated as
-.72 by Koo and Watt using the general functional form
based on the Box-Cox transformation.  Hwang estimated
the  demand  elasticity  as  -.99  using the  ordinary  least
squares  method,  and  Ryu used  the  value  of -. 94  as  a
demand elasticity  in  his  paper  on  demand  and  supply
analysis of South  Korean  livestock  products.  Table  A3
reports the complete set of own and cross-price elasticities
estimated by Koo and Watt.
On the supply side, a study by Huh using the distributed
lag model developed  by Nerlove  resulted in an estimate
of a short-run elasticity of .44 and of a long-run elasticity
of 1.39. 1 0In addition to his demand estimates, Hwang also
estimated  supply elasticity  by type of animal  (table A2).
Tyers and Anderson  used the parameters  -1.0  and  .5 as
price elasticities  of demand and supply,  respectively,  for
the South Korean beef market in their simulation model
of world  grain and meat markets.  Anderson  (1981)  em-
ployed the values -.6  and .4 as demand and supply elas-
ticities for his studies on the welfare effects  of South Ko-
rea's agricultural protection policies.
10  Most cattle-raising farms in Korea use byproducts from crop
production for feed,  and farmers  are faced with fixed  assets and
few good alternative uses  for them. In addition, at least  a couple
of years is required to raise calves and supply them for slaughter.
Thus, the  short-run supply elasticity  for cattle  may be quite  low
in Korea.  However,  as  the  period  becomes  longer,  the  farmers
have  better information and knowledge  concerning  adjustments
to price changes, resulting in a more elastic long-run cattle supply
response (Huh).
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Table Al.  Baseline  Parameters of Prices and Quantities, 1981-84
Unit  1981  1982  1983  1984  1981-84
Domestic Price (P)
a w/kg  5,714  6,381  6,916  6,043  6,264
Import Price (P,)b  w/kg  2,362  2,387  2,659  2,414  2,456
$/mt  2,933  2,782  2,937  2,836  2,873
Pp/p  2.42  2.67  2.60  2.50  2.55
P, (=  1.25P)  w/kg  2,953  2,984  3,324  3,018  3,070
Production (Q 3)  1,000 mt  69.2  61.4  66.1  90.8  71.9
Consumption (Q 4)  1,000 mt  93.9  102.9  116.3  114.8  107.0
Imports (Q 4 - Q 3)  1,000 mt  24.7  41.5  50.2  24.0  35.1
Self-Sufficiency  Level (Q 3/Q 4)  %  73.7  59.7  56.8  79.1  67.2
Exchange rate  w/$  681.1  731.1  776.0  806.0  748.6
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and  Fisheries; National  Livestock  Cooperatives Federation; and Shin.
Note: All prices are in 1985 won (w).
a Wholesale  price in Seoul area based on boneless beef.
b Calculated by dividing the value of total imports by the quantity of total imports.
Table A2.  Estimates  of Price Elasticity of Demand  and Supply for Beef in South  Korea
Source  Supply Elasticity  Demand Elasticity  Period of Analysis
Koo and Watt  -0.72  1961-85
Ryu  -0.94  1967-77




Huh  0.44  1959-78
1.39a
Anderson (1981)  0.4
b -0.6b
Tyers and Anderson  0.5b  -l.Ob
a Long-run estimate.
b Postulated.
Table A3.  Estimates of Own and Cross-Price
Elasticities from Koo  and Watt
Price of
Demand for  Beef  Pork  Poultry
Beef  -0.72  0.33  0.65
Pork  0.29  -1.13  0.03
Poultry  1.17  0.06  -0.38
Income  1.09  1.10  0.34
Table A4.  Basic Data for Analysis
Unit  1981  1982  1983  1984  1981-84
Agricultural  Value Addeda  bil. won  8,797  9,075  9,676  9,695  9,311
Per Farm Income
b 1,000 won  2,929  3,558  3,887  3,906  3,570
Total Population  1,000  38,723  39,326  39,929  40,513  39,623
Farm Population  1,000  9,999  9,688  9,475  9,015  9,544
Number of Farms  1,000  2,030  1,996  2,000  1,974  2,000
Persons per Farm  4.93  4.85  4.74  4.57  4.77
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Table A4.  Continued
Unit  1981  1982  1983  1984  1981-84
Number of Cattle-Raising Farms  1,000  876  919  1,001  1,075  968
Native  1,000  858  896  971  1,037  941
Dairy  1,000  18  23  30  38  27
Number of Cattle  1,000  1,506  1,754  2,215  2,652  2,032
Native  1,000  1,312  1,526  1,940  2,318  1,774
Dairy  1,000  194  228  275  334  258
Number of Animals Per Farm
Raising Cattle  1.7  1.9  2.2  2.5  2.1
Of which Native  1.5  1.7  2.0  2.2  1.9
Of which Dairy  10.8  9.9  9.2  8.8  9.6
eD  -0.99
es
Case I  1.12
Case II  .44
Sources:  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,  and Fisheries; National  Livestock Cooperatives  Federation.
Note: Agricultural value added and per farm income are in 1985 won. In the text all data have been converted to dollars at an exchange
rate of 748.6.
a  Includes forestry  and fisheries sectors.
b Off-farm  income is not included.
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